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I. INTRODUCTION
The express purpose of the Virginia Administrative Process Act
(VAPA)' is to supplement present and future basic laws that con-
fer authority on agencies to make regulations and decide cases, and
to standardize court review thereof except where laws later enacted
* This article addresses legislation from the 1988 session of the General Assembly and
decisions of Virginia Courts issued from May 1987 through May 3, 1988.
** Partner, Roberts & Buniva, Chesterfield, Virginia; A.B., 1972, Georgetown University;
Graduate Studies in Public Administration, 1973-74, American University; J.D., 1979, T.C.
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to :25 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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may otherwise expressly provide.2 VAPA does not supercede or re-
peal additional procedural requirements set forth in the basic
laws.s Instead, its purpose is to supplement the procedural require-
ments of existing laws.4 The "basic law" includes provisions in the
constitution and statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia which
authorize a state government agency to make regulations or decide
cases, or which contain procedural requirements for such
activities.5
Due to the potential modification of VAPA procedures by legis-
lative changes to an agency's "basic law," it is not possible to pro-
vide a comprehensive update on Virginia administrative procedure
during the past year without reviewing legislative changes or court
interpretations of the "basic laws" for each agency of state govern-
ment. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of an annual sur-
vey of Virginia law on administrative procedure.6 Consequently,
this article will address the relatively few legislative changes affect-
ing VAPA itself and the growing body of judicial decisions which
continue to give direction and clarification to practitioners of state
administrative law in Virginia. Practitioners must review the basic
law, as well as VAPA, to ensure that all procedures are
understood.
2. Id. § 9-6.14:3.
3. Id.
4. Id. revisor's note.
5. Id. § 9-6.14:4(C).
6. For example, during the 1988 session, the Virginia General Assembly recodified Title
54 of the Code of Virginia relating to professions and occupations, which includes agencies
within the Department of Commerce and the Department of Health Professions. Act of
April 11, 1988, ch. 765, 1988 Va. Acts 1016. The General Assembly also recodified Title 10,
which includes state agencies relating to conservation, historic preservation, scenic rivers,
flood protection and dam safety, shoreline erosion, forestry, environmental quality, air pol-
lution, and the regulation of solid, hazardous and radioactive wastes. Act of April 20, 1988,
ch. 891, 1988 Va. Acts 1874. These basic laws must be reviewed to ascertain all procedural
requirements when representing clients within the jurisdiction of a state agency. Procedures
under the basic law can override procedural requirements under VAPA. See Commonwealth
v. County Utils. Corp., 223 Va. 534, 541, 290 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1982); see also Adams, The
Virginia Administrative Process Act: The Yellow Brick Road of State Government, 36 Va.
B. News No. 8 15-18 (Feb. 1988).
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II. JUDIciAL DECISIONS AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Combination of Functions Within Agency Passes Judicial
Muster
A due process challenge to the fundamental method by which
many state agencies render case decisions failed in the Virginia Su-
preme Court this year. In many respects, the court's decision in
Hladys v. Commonwealth' was the most significant case regarding
administrative law in the Commonwealth. In Hladys, the supreme
court held that there was no per se due process violation resulting
from the combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions
in the Office of the Attorney General. Further, the court found
that no per se due process violation existed even though the
agency's hearing officer was an official of the same agency that in-
vestigated and prosecuted the case, and was a colleague of the
chief witness against the accused.$ A contrary holding would have
caused wholesale changes in the approach employed by the Office
of the Attorney General and many state agencies when prosecuting
and adjudicating case decisions.
Dr. Hladys had a contract with the State Department of Health
to be a "physician-provider" under the Virginia Medical Assistance
Program (Medicaid). After an investigation into his billing prac-
tices, Dr. Hladys received a contract termination notice. An admin-
istrative hearing was conducted at Dr. Hladys' request, resulting in
a determination against the physician. On appeal, the circuit court
remanded to the agency for further proceedings.
At the second administrative hearing, an assistant health com-
missioner was appointed as the hearing officer, an assistant attor-
ney general was designated as counsel to the hearing officer to ad-
vise on procedural and evidentiary matters, and a second assistant
attorney general prosecuted the case for the Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth's chief witness was the deputy health commis-
sioner-the immediate superior of the hearing officer at the State
Department of Health. The decision of this second hearing was ad-
verse to Dr. Hladys as was his appeal to the circuit court.
Dr. Hladys' appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was limited to
the question of whether the second administrative hearing was so
7. 235 Va. 145, 366 S.E.2d 98 (1988).
8. Id. at 148, 366 S.E.2d at 100.
9. Id. at 146, 366 S.E.2d at 99.
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procedurally flawed as to deny Hladys due process of law.10 Hladys
contended that the combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial
functions in the Office of the Attorney General as well as the ap-
pointment of a hearing officer who was an official of the investigat-
ing and prosecuting agency, and a colleague of the chief witness
against him, was a per se deprivation of due process.
In deciding the merits of this argument, the Virginia Supreme
Court analyzed the minimum requirements of constitutional due
process for administrative hearings set out in Goldberg v. Kelly."
In Kelly, the United States Supreme Court determined that one
such requirement is the right to be tried by an impartial decision-
maker. The Kelly Court noted that an official of the agency in-
volved could serve as the decision-maker, even if the official had
some prior involvement with the case, as long as that decision-
maker did not participate in making the determination under
review."
The Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Hladys turned on the
presumption of official regularity, or rather, a presumption that
public officials have acted correctly.' The court stated that
"[w]ithout a showing to the contrary, state administrators 'are as-
sumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable
of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances.' -14 This same presumption was accorded to the as-
sistant attorneys general involved in the Hladys case.15 Although
the presumption may be overcome by evidence of bias or improper
conduct, such evidence was not offered by Dr. Hladys.' 6
While the Hladys decision is supported by opinions from the
United States Supreme Court and other courts, 7 one wonders if
there are any circumstances, absent proof of actual bias, which
would prompt the Virginia Supreme Court to hold that a peti-
tioner had been denied his constitutional right to a hearing before
an impartial decision-maker. In Hladys, the third-ranking admin-
istrator within the State Department of Health was required to
10. Id.
11. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12. Id. at 271.
13. Hladys, 235 Va. at 149, 366 S.E.2d at 100.
14. Id. at 148, 366 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1974)
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).
15. 235 Va. at 149, 366 S.E.2d at 100.
16. Id.
17. See cases cited in Hladys, 235 Va. 145, 366 S.E.2d 98.
[Vol. 22:475
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
judge the credibility of the second-ranking administrator within
the same agency. It is obviously difficult-but theoretically possi-
ble-for a subordinate to publicly question an immediate supe-
rior's credibility without any fear of consequences.
The Canons of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Virginia Su-
preme Court require a judge to disqualify himself in any proceed-
ing in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.18
The Canon states that a judge "should not suffer his conduct to
justify the impression that any person can improperly influence
him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by his kinship,
rank, position or influence of any party or other person."19 The
application of this standard in the context of Hladys would have
led in all likelihood to the hearing officer's disqualification. The
procedure employed in Hladys, while not per se constitutionally
infirm, leaves a great deal to be desired from the standpoint of
avoiding the appearance of impropriety and ensuring impartial
tribunals in state administrative agency proceedings.
Arguably, the General Assembly remedied the hearing officer
problem presented in the Hladys case by an amendment to VAPA,
section 9-6.14:14.1, which relates to the appointment of hearing of-
ficers to preside over formal hearings that are conducted pursuant
to section 9-6.14:12.20 The amendment directs the use of indepen-
dent lawyer contractors for the conduct of such hearings.2 1 How-
ever, a 1987 amendment to section 1.17-2 of the Code of Virginia
authorizes an agency to delegate to any agency officer or employee
the duties and responsibilities imposed on the agency by law.22
Therefore, one commentator has noted that since many agency
laws require the agency to conduct formal adjudicative hearings,
section 1-17.2 seems to repeal by necessary implication section 9-
6.14:14.1 as far as limiting an agency's ability to appoint its own
presiding officer for a formal hearing. 23 Thus, the Hladys hearing
officer situation could occur again. Moreover, Hladys involved an
18. Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt.6, § III, Canon 3C(a).
19. Id.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1-17.2 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
23. See Jones, Administrative Procedure: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH.
L. RE V. 611, 619-21 (1987). In 1988, the General Assembly amended § 1-17.2 and enacted §
2.1-20.01:2. Act of March 24, 1988, ch. 273, 1988 Va. Acts 330 (codified as amended at Va.
Code Ann. § 2.1-20.012 (Cum. Supp. 1988)). Section 2.1-20.01:2, however, does not remedy
the conflict described by Professor Jones.
19881
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informal hearing pursuant to Virginia Code section 9-6.14:11. Most
agency proceedings are of the informal variety, and thus, the re-
quirement in section 9-6.14:14.1 to appoint an independent hearing
officer for formal hearings would not apply to the majority of state
administrative hearings conducted in Virginia. Even if an indepen-
dent lawyer is selected as a hearing officer pursuant to section 9-
6.14:14.1, the agency's ability to control the outcome of a case deci-
sion is inherent in the current procedure. The agency can-and
often does-direct the hearing officer to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but not to make recommendations for disposi-
tion.24 Exceptions can be filed to the hearing officer's findings and
conclusions by both the prosecuting assistant attorney general and
counsel for the other party.25
The agency retains the power to change the hearing officer's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, including findings based
upon a determination of the credibility of a witness whom the
agency did not observe testify.26 The agency's decision to alter a
hearing officer's findings is not governed by any standard such as
the "abuse of discretion" of clearly erroneous standards applicable
to overturning judge or jury findings.
An agency decision to revise findings of fact is reached typically
in executive session on advice from an agency counsel. The agency
counsel is not the prosecutor, but a different assistant attorney
general who often works side by side within the same section of the
Office of the Attorney General as the prosecutor. Thus, findings of
fact can be removed from the independent hearing officer's deter-
mination, even though he or she may be the only official in a posi-
tion to personally judge the credibility of a witness.
The current agency hearing system is analogous to one attorney
from a private law firm presenting a case before a non-lawyer arbi-
tration panel that is counseled by a second lawyer from the same
firm. The only protection available to litigants before state agen-
cies is the presumption of official regularity which we must trust to
be well-founded. Governor Gerald L. Baliles, while serving as At-
torney General, recognized some of the shortcomings described
herein and proposed the enactment of legislation to establish a sys-
tem by which administrative law judges would conduct agency
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:12(C) (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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hearings. The bill did not garner enough support in the General
Assembly. However, in light of the Hladys decision, perhaps a sim-
ilar proposal will be revived.
B. Judicial Deference to the State Agency
Virginia courts have rendered several decisions giving deference to
an agency's interpretation of the statutes that it is charged to ad-
minister and enforce. In King Land Corp. v. Board of Supervi-
sors,27 a divided panel of the court of appeals held that the State
Board of Health's failure to promulgate statutorily mandated fi-
nancial responsibility regulations for a period of seven years did
not invalidate a private corporation's state permit to operate a
solid waste, nonhazardous landfill. In the dissent, Judge Benton
forcefully argued that the majority opinion rendered meaningless
the statutory command that the Board of Health shall promulgate
the regulations.28
The majority based its opinion upon the absence of a specified
deadline in the statute for promulgation by the Board of Health.29
In addition, after a review of the legislative history, the majority
presumed that the General Assembly was aware that final regula-
tions had not been promulgated 0 and deferred to the agency's in-
terpretation of the statutory mandate.3 1 Although, the majority
utilized the foregoing statutory construction aids, it claimed it ap-
plied the "plain-meaning" rule and declared the statute to be clear
and unambiguous.32
The state permit in King Land was challenged by the Board of
Supervisors on the ground that the issuance of the permit in the
absence of the required regulations on financial responsibility con-
27. 4 Va. App. 597, 359 S.E.2d 823 (1987).
28. Id. at 607, 359 S.E.2d at 828.
29. Id. at 603, 359 S.E.2d at 826.
30. Id. at 604-05, 359 S.E.2d at 826-27.
31. Id. at 605, 359 S.E.2d at 827.
32. See id. at 605, 359 S.E.2d at 827. But see Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 330 S.E.2d
84 (1985).
When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules for construction of stat-
utes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Therefore, when the language of an enact-
ment is free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts is not
permitted because we take the words as written to determine their meaning.
Id. at 321, 330 S.E.2d at 87; 17 MIcHIE's JuR. Statutes § 40 (Repl. Vol. 1979 & 1987 Cum.
Supp.). Since the court in King Land determined the statute to be clear and unambiguous,
the evidence of agency interpretation and court deference thereto was inadmissible and
inappropriately considered.
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stituted an "error of law" under section 9-6.14:17 which required
the permit to be set aside under section 9-6.14:19.11
The majority relied in part upon an affidavit submitted by the
agency which stated that the intent of the statute was for the State
Board of Health to mirror federal regulations on financial responsi-
bility. The federal regulations were never enacted because of the
national difficulty encountered by facility operators in obtaining fi-
nancial assurances in the market place.3 4 The majority assumed
that the General Assembly was aware of the issuance of seventy-
three permits without the required regulations and, over a period
of seven years, acquiesced in the agency's interpretation and
practice:3 5
The elementary rule of statutory interpretation is that the construc-
tion accorded a statute by public officials charged with its adminis-
tration and enforcement is entitled to be given great weight by the
court. The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construc-
tion. When it has long continued without change, the legislature will
be presumed to have acquiesced therein."8
In the dissent, Judge Benton gave no deference to agency inter-
pretation. He relied instead on what in his view was the clear and
unambiguous statutory language.3 7 Judge Benton felt that the fail-
ure of the Board of Health to comply with the statutory mandate
within a reasonable period of time rendered the grant of the per-
33. King Land, 4 Va. App. at 599, 359 S.E.2d at 824.
34. Id. at 604-05, 359 S.E.2d at 826-27. The impact on the court of the fact that seventy-
three other permits, issued after enactment of the statute, would be of questionable validity
if the trial court's decision had been affirmed should not be overlooked.
35. Id. at 605, 359 S.E.2d at 827.
36. Id. (quoting Peyton v. Williams, 206 Va. 595, 600, 145 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1965)).
37. Id. at 606, 359 S.E.2d at 828. Judge Benton stated that:
[T]he Board was given an express mandate to begin the process of promulgating reg-
ulations responsive to the General Assembly's concerns. Code § 32.1-182(c) explicitly
and uncharacteristically commanded that the Board 'shall make available for public
hearing and comment an initial draft' of the regulations '[n]o sooner than October 1,
1980, and no later than March 1, 1981.' The process was to culminate in accordance
with the unambiguous command of Code § 32.1-182(A) that '[t]he Board shall no
sooner than October 1, 1981, promulgate' the final financial responsibility regula-
tions .... The statute leads necessarily to the conclusion that the final regulations
were to be promulgated 'no sooner than October 1, 1981' but certainly within a rea-
sonable time period subsequent to the statutorily mandated public hearing and com-
ments on the initial draft .... The Board had no discretion to elect to forego enact-
ing the regulations.
Id. at 606-07, 359 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added); see also supra note 32.
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mit in the absence of the promulgation of the financial assurance
regulations to be a "case decision" not in accordance with law."
Virginia Circuit Court decisions rendered after King Land were
less deferential to agency interpretation than the court of appeals.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Commissioner of Labor and Industry v.
Southern Brick Contractors,"9 Judge Kulp rejected the agency in-
terpretation of a Federal Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) regulation that the agency was charged with en-
forcing. The standard required a guard to be placed on machinery
with moving parts if such parts were exposed to contact with em-
ployees or otherwise created a hazard. The court noted that the
regulation cloaks the state inspector with a degree of discretion in
determining if the regulation has been violated.
The court rejected the inspector's interpretation that a citation
should be issued if, in the agency's view, the absence of a guard
would make an accident more possible. In the court's view, such an
interpretation would give the agency unbridled discretion with due
process implications and allow application of the standard to situa-
tions posing insignificant risks that are beyond the scope of
OSHA.40 Therefore, the court required the agency to show that the
absence of the guard presented a significant risk of harm which in
Southern Brick, the agency could not do.
A close reading of Southern Brick reveals no real erosion to the
principle of judicial deference to agency interpretation of regula-
tions. The court's ruling is grounded in the belief that the agency
interpretation exceeded the scope of agency authority under the
enabling law.4' The agency interpretation deserved and in this
case, received no deference when it exceeded the statutory man-
date. Hence, Judge Kulp's decision is consistent with prior judicial
decisions.42
In Red River Coal Co. v. Division of Mined Land,4 3 Judge
Stump did not accord deference to the agency's interpretation of
38. See King Land, 4 Va. App. at 609, 359 S.E.2d at 828-30.
39. 10 Va. Cir. 188 (Henrico County 1987).
40. Id. at 190.
41. "Congress was concerned, not with absolute safety, but with the elimination of sig-
nificant harm." Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646
(1980).
42. See 2 Am. Ju&a 2D Administrative Law §§ 296, 300 (1962); cf. Commonwealth v.
County Utilities, 223 Va. 534, 546 (1982).
43. 9 Va. Cir. 249 (Wise County 1987).
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its enabling act and regulations under the Coal Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act. The issue in Red River was whether
the agency had the authority to vacate a notice of violation if it
was validly issued. The Commissioner felt that he lacked the statu-
tory authority. The Wise County Circuit Court held that the issue
did not involve specialized expertise regarding the regulated indus-
try but instead involved an application of common law principles
and statutory interpretation. Therefore, the court determined that
the issue fell within an exception to the agency deference rule and
accordingly, gave its interpretation little deference."'
The two circuit court opinions, Southern Brick and Red River,
demonstrate a refreshing approach by the judiciary to indepen-
dently scrutinize agency interpretations of law and to apply excep-
tions to the general rule of judicial deference to agency interpreta-
tions. Independent judicial review of questions of law is essential
to a fair resolution of disputes with state agencies, particularly in
light of VAPA's requirements for judicial deference on factual de-
terminations made by the agency.4"
The Virginia Court of Appeals in Bio-Medical Applications, Inc.
v. Kenley e elaborated on the deference accorded to an agency's
findings of fact when the substantial evidence test is applied.47 The
case's major contribution to existing jurisprudence is the consoli-
dation of authorities defining the scope of judicial review with re-
spect to the substantial evidence test, the degree of judicial defer-
ence to agency findings, and the presumptions that attach in favor
of the agency.48
44. Id. at 251 (citing K. DAvis, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 7:22 at p. 105 (2d ed.
1978)).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
When the decision on review is so to be made on such agency record, the duty of the
court with respect to issues of fact is limited to ascertaining whether there was sub-
stantial evidence in the agency record upon which the agency as the trier of the facts
could reasonably find them to be as it did ....
Id.
46. 4 Va. App. 414, 358 S.E.2d 722 (1987).
47. Id. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 729. The term "substantial evidence" as used in § 9-6.14:17
refers to "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125
(1983) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). A reviewing
"court may reject agency findings of fact 'only if, considering the record as a whole, a rea-
sonable mind, would necessarily come to a different conclusion.'" Bias, 226 Va. at 269, 308
S.E.2d at 125 (quoting B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATE LAW 51.01 (1981)).
48. Kenley, 4 Va. App. at 427-29, 358 S.E.2d at 729-30.
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If a formal hearing has been conducted pursuant to VAPA,49 the
determination of factual issues is made upon the whole evidential
record compiled by the agency." The scope of review is limited to
a search in the record for substantial evidence to support the
agency's decision. 1 Substantial evidence means "'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.' ,,52 A "court may reject agency findings 'only if, con-
sidering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessa-
rily come to a different conclusion.' ,,53 The substantial evidence
test is designed to give great stability and all but absolute finality
to the fact-findings of an administrative agency.5 4
Finally, under this deferential standard, the court must review
the record in the light most favorable to the agency's decision. Due
account must be taken of the presumption of official regularity, the
experience and specialized competence of the agency, and the pur-
poses of the basic law under which the agency has acted. Is it any
wonder that there are few, if any, reported decisions in Virginia of
successful challenges to state agency decisions based upon a claim
that the agency record lacked substantial evidence to support the
agency findings of fact? Not surprisingly, the challenge in Bio-
Medical Applications was unsuccessful.5 6
In Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley,57 the court of appeals ana-
lyzed the State Health Commissioner's denial of a Certificate of
Need (CON) giving comprehensive and overdue guidance on the
standard of review and degree of judicial deference to be accorded
to agency case decisions. The court defines specifically the appro-
priate standard of review in terms of the degree of deference to be
given to agency decisions by distinguishing between whether the
issue was legal, factual, or mixed questions of law and fact and
whether the issue fell within the area of "experience and special-
ized competence of the agency."58
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:12 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
50. Id. § 9-6.14:17(a).
51. State Bd. of Health v. Godfrey, 223 Va. 423, 433, 290 S.E.2d 875, 879-80 (1982).
52. Bias, 226 Va. at 269, 308 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
53. Id. (quoting B. MEzINEs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01 (1981) (emphasis in original)).
54. Bias, 226 Va. at 269, 308 S.E.2d at 125.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17; Virginia ABC Comm'n v. York Street Inn, 220 Va. 310,
313, 257 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1979).
56. Kenley, 4 Va. App. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 732.
57. 6 Va. App. 231, 369 S.E.2d 1 (1988).
58. Id. at 242-46, 369 S.E.2d at 7-11.
1988]
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Johnston-Willis reiterated that under VAPA, the burden is
upon the party challenging the agency's decision to demonstrate an
error of law subject to review. These "errors of law" include:
1. Agency failure to accord constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity;
2. Agency failure to comply with statutory authority, jurisdic-
tion limitations, or right as provided in the basic laws;
3. Agency failure to observe required procedures where the fail-
ure is not mere harmless error; and
4. Agency failure to have substantial evidential support for find-
ings of fact.5"
The court observed that factual issues are generally accorded
greater deference to give stability and finality to the fact finding of
the agency. Such factual findings are accorded great deference
under the substantial evidence standard of review. 0 However, in
the view of the Johnston-Willis court, agency determinations of
legal issues are accorded less deference.
Thus, where the legal issues require a determination by the review-
ing court whether an agency has, for example, accorded constitu-
tional rights, failed to comply with statutory authority, or failed to
observe required procedures, less deference is required and the re-
viewing courts should not abdicate their judicial function and
merely rubber-stamp an agency determination.6 1
If the legal issue falls outside the area generally entrusted to the
agency and is one in which the courts have special competence, i.e.,
the common law or constitutional law, then there should be little
or no deference to the agency interpretation. When the legal inter-
pretation is within the specialized competence of an agency which
has been entrusted with wide discretion by the legislature, then the
agency's interpretation of the law it administers and enforces is
entitled to special weight by the courts.2 Thus, the basic law of
59. Id. at 241-42, 369 S.E.2d at 6-7; VAL CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
60. Johnston- Willis, 6 Va. App. at 243, 369 S.E.2d at 7; see supra notes 47-56 and ac-
companying text.
61. Johnston- Willis, 6 Va. App. at 243, 369 S.E.2d at 7-8.
62. Id. at 244, 369 S.E.2d at 8. "[T]he court shall take due account of the presumption of
official regularity, the experience and specialized competence of the agency, and the pur-
poses of the basic law under which the agency has acted." VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl.
Vol. 1985).
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the agency and the purposes it seeks to accomplish are crucial to
proper judicial review of an agency decision. 3
The Johnston-Willis court summarized the standard of review
and degree of deference to agency decisions as follows:
In summary, the four issues of law subject to judicial review pursu-
ant to Code § 9-6.14:17 present distinct issues that must be reviewed
by the court utilizing separate standards. These separate standards
of review dictate the degree of deference, if any, to be given an
agency's decision on appeal. Where the issue is whether there is sub-
stantial evidence to support findings of fact, great deference is to be
accorded the agency decision. Where the issue falls outside the spe-
cialized competence of the agency, such as constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation issues, little deference is required to be accorded
the agency decision. Where, however, the issue concerns an agency
decision based on the proper application of its expert discretion, the
reviewing court will not substitute its own independent judgment
for that of the agency but rather will reverse the agency decision
only if that decision was arbitrary and capricious. Finally, in review-
ing an agency decision, the courts are required to consider the expe-
rience and specialized competence of the agency and the purposes of
the basic law under which the agency acted."
After enunciating these standards, the court analyzed each of the
six issues presented, characterized each in accordance with the ap-
propriate standard, and accorded the degree of deference appropri-
ate to its characterization.
In addition to enunciating a comprehensive standard of review
and appropriate degrees of deference, the Johnston-Willis opinion
applied the harmless error doctrine. The court acknowledged that
the State Medical Facilities Plan, which was relied upon by the
Commissioner in denying the CON, did not comply with the filing
requirements of the Virginia Register Act. 5 The court found that
the agency's failure to meet the filing requirements of the Virginia
Register Act, although an error of law as defined by section 9-
6.14:17 of the Code of Virginia, was mere harmless error since the
Plan was merely a statistical update required by the basic law, and
63. Johnston-Willis, 6 Va. App. at 244, 369 S.E.2d at 8.
64. Id. at 246, 369 S.E.2d at 9.
65. VA. CODE AN. §§ 9-6.15-6.22 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
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did not involve the exercise of agency discretion or substantive
changes. 6
Johnston-Willis also contended that it did not have notice, pur-
suant to section 9-6.14:11, of all contrary facts in the possession of
the agency upon which the Commissioner could rely in making an
adverse decision. On two grounds, the court rejected the conten-
tion that Johnston-Willis did not have notice of the Commis-
sioner's intention to apply a seventy-five percent occupancy stan-
dard for the type of obstetrical unit proposed. First, the court
declared that the standard was not a "fact," but a regulatory
guideline. As such, section 9-6.14:11 did not require prior notice.
Secondly, the court noted that in prior obstetrical unit CON cases,
the Commissioner had applied the same standard, and therefore,
such prior decisions were public records subject to judicial notice.
Hence the court concluded that the Commissioner could act upon
the record presented and other matters that are properly received
through "official notice." 7
The court did find that the Commissioner had improperly con-
sidered extra-record evidence, but such consideration did not com-
pel a remand to the agency. 8 Although the court acknowledged
that members of an administrative body must base decisions on
evidence produced before them, it held that rules of evidence in an
administrative proceeding are relaxed and findings will not be re-
versed solely because extra-record evidence was considered.6 9 To
obtain a reversal, the appellant must make "a clear showing of
prejudice arising from the admission of such evidence, or unless it
is plain that the agency's conclusions were determined by the im-
proper evidence, and that a contrary result would have been
reached in its absence. '7 0 The court determined that the Commis-
sioner's decision was based upon a multitude of proper factors and
that the extra-record evidence was not dispositive."
66. Johnston-Willis, 6 Va. App. at 248-49, 369 S.E.2d at 10-11.
67. Id. at 254-58, 369 S.E.2d at 15-16. But see State Farm Mut. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492,
497, 318 S.E.2d 393, 395-96 (1984) (party must be afforded an opportunity to dispute judi-
cially noticed facts); MN American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d
1483 (9th Cir. 1983) (court may not take notice of proceedings or records in another case to
supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a contention in
the case before it); C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA, § 284 (2d. ed. 1983).
68. Johnston-Willis, 6 Va. App. at 258, 369 S.E.2d at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 258, 369 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va.
264, 270, 308 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983)).
71. Id. at 258-59, 369 S.E.2d at 16.
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The Johnston-Willis decision is a major contribution to the law
of judicial review of agency decisions. For the first time, a Virginia
court has given comprehensive treatment to the standard of review
under VAPA and the degree of judicial deference to be accorded to
the multitude of issues raised in administrative appeals. Close
scrutiny of Johnston-Willis is essential for practitioners of admin-
istrative law in Virginia.
C. Standing to Challenge Agency Action
The recent trend by the Virginia Supreme Court narrowing the
class of plaintiffs meeting the necessary requirements to establish
standing to challenge governmental decisions continued in the
court of appeals with its decision in D'Alessio v. Lukhard.2 In this
case of first impression, the court determined that D'Alessio, the
father of a child alleged to have been sexually abused, did not have
standing under VAPA to appeal the ruling of the Commissioner of
Social Services expunging the name of the alleged abuser of his
daughter from the central registry for child abuse and neglect. 3
An investigation by Child Protective Services resulted in a deter-
mination that a foundation existed for a complaint by the father
that his two-and-one-half year-old daughter had been sexually
abused by the boyfriend of his estranged wife. Pursuant to stat-
ute, 4 the boyfriend's name was entered on the central registry as a
child abuser. The boyfriend commenced an administrative appeal
of which the father received no notice. The father learned of the
appeal and submitted a letter and other evidence which resulted in
a denial of the boyfriend's appeal to the chief of the Bureau of
Child Welfare Services. The boyfriend then appealed to the Com-
missioner who reversed the prior decisions and expunged the name
from the registry. D'Alessio had no notice of the second appeal and
only learned of it after the Commissioner rendered his decision. 5
D'Alessio filed a timely notice and petition for appeal in circuit
court, pursuant to VAPA, alleging that as the father of the victim
he had a right to participate in the appeal by the boyfriend and
that he was aggrieved by the agency decision. The trial court sus-
tained the Commissioner's demurrer to D'Alessio's petition holding
72. 5 Va. App. 404, 363 S.E.2d 715 (1988).
73. Id.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(D)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
75. D'Alessio, 5 Va. App. at 406, 363 S.E.2d at 717.
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that he had no right to participate in the agency process and that
he was not an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of the law.7 6
The court adopted a narrow interpretation of D'Alessio's legal
interest in the expungement proceedings. While acknowledging
that D'Alessio, as a parent, had an understandable interest in the
proceeding, "it was not a legal interest sufficient under the law to
give him standing to appeal. '77 The court noted that D'Alessio's
rights to pursue other means of relief were not affected. He could
still seek injunctive relief against the abuser or seek criminal pros-
ecution. The court also stated that the ruling appealed by the boy-
friend was favorable to D'Alessio, and thus, even if he were a
proper party, D'Alessio would not have been able to appeal be-
cause the agency regulations only provide for appeal of a refusal to
purge. s
Although the court did not cite the Virginia Supreme Court's
recent decision in Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v.
Board of Zoning Appeals,7 9 the court did cite to Virginia Associa-
tion of Insurance Agents v. Commonwealth,s° a case that was fol-
lowed by the Beautification Commission court. The court relied
upon the definition of the word "aggrieved" as used in VAPA and
defined in Insurance Agents as a "substantial grievance, a denial
of some personal or property right, legal or equitable, or the impo-
sition upon a party of a burden or obligation."81 The court noted
that D'Alessio was not denied personal or property rights, and no
burden or obligation was imposed upon him. Thus, he was not "ag-
grieved" by the decision and had no standing to appeal.
The D'Alessio decision evidences a continuation of what has
been described as "judicial reluctance to acquiesce in the trend
elsewhere [other than Virginia] recognizing a wider set of interests
sufficient for standing." 2 Read together, Beautification Commis-
sion and D'Alessio restrict access to the courts for the purpose of
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The court overlooks the fact that if D'Alessio was a proper party, he would have
been entitled to notice and to participate in all further appellate proceedings as an appellee.
See VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:9, 5:17, 5A:6, 5A:12, 2A:2, 2A:4 (1988) (these rules require that notice
and petition for appeal be served upon every party to the decision appealed from).
79. 231 Va. 415, 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).
80. 201 Va. 249, 253, 110 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1959).
81. 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 183b (1957), quoted in Insurance Agents, 201 Va. at 253,
110 S.E.2d at 226.
82. Jones, supra note 23, at 632.
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challenging an agency decision to persons who suffer immediate in-
jury to one or more of the following interests: pecuniary, personal,
property, ownership, or the imposition of a burden or obligation. If
this trend continues, the courts will eliminate any role in protect-
ing the general public interest except as that interest may be iden-
tified with governmental action.
D. Part 2A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia Are
Jurisdictional
The court of appeals has held that Part 2A of the Rules of the
Supreme Court relating to the time limitations for perfection of an
appeal from an agency decision to the circuit court are mandatory
and jurisdictional.83 In Mayo v. Department of Commerce s4 the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of
the agency decision,85 but failed to file a petition for appeal within
thirty days thereafter as required by rule 2A:4 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court.88 After the thirty days elapsed, Mayo filed a mo-
tion for an extension of time to file her petition for appeal. The
Department's motion to dismiss was granted by the circuit court,
which held that the time limitation in rule 2A:4(a) is mandatory
and jurisdictional, and that the court is without authority to en-
large or modify the time limitations in the rules.
8 7
The court, relying upon supreme court authority interpreting
Part 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court,88 held that the failure to
present the petition for appeal within the time provided by the
rules is fatal. The court found the rationale for dismissing appeals
at the appellate level for failure to comply with time requirements
equally applicable to appeals to circuit courts from administrative
agency decisions:
83. Mayo v. Department of Commerce, 4 Va. App. 520, 358 S.E.2d 759 (1987).
84. Id.
85. The court noted that the notice of appeal required by rule 2A:2 was filed with the
circuit court. The record was unclear as to whether the notice had been filed with the
agency secretary as required by the rule. Since the Department did not raise that issue, the
court assumed that the notice was timely filed with the agency as required. In light of the
court's broad language regarding the mandatory nature of court rules, it is assumed that
failure to timely file the notice with the agency would also be grounds for dismissal of the
appeal. Id. at 522 n.2, 358 S.E.2d at 760 n.2.
86. Mayo's counsel had apparently engaged in some preliminary manuevers in the circuit
court, including an attempt to stay the agency decision, within the thirty-day period. Id. at
523, 358 S.E.2d at 760.
87. Id.
88. Condrey v. Childress, 203 Va. 755, 758, 127 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1962).
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The purpose of the specific time limit is not to penalize the appel-
lant but to protect the appellee. If the required papers are not filed
in 60 days, the appellee is entitled to assume that the litigation is
ended, and to act on that assumption. Litigation is a serious and
harassing matter, and the right to know when it is ended is a valua-
ble right."9
It has long been assumed by practitioners of administrative law
that the reasoning adopted by the supreme court-regarding ad-
herence to rules of court for perfecting appeals to the supreme
court-also applies to appeals from state agencies. Although the
Virginia Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue,9° lawyers
who ignore the mandatory appellate deadlines are advised to keep
their malpractice insurance premiums current. 1
III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING VIRGINIA ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE
The 1988 session of the Virginia General Assembly made rela-
tively minor adjustments to VAPA. Three of the bills amended the
exemptions and exclusions section of VAPA.9 2 A fourth bill, while
not amending VAPA, added a new section on appellate procedure
which reverses the outcome of last year's supreme court decision in
Commonwealth v. Yeatts.93
Perhaps the most significant legislative action taken by the Gen-
eral Assembly in the area of administrative law was the enactment
of the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act.94 Although the Act does
not affect VAPA per se, it utilizes procedures under VAPA to exer-
cise unique powers granted to a new State agency, and thus is wor-
thy of mention here.
89. Avery v. County School Bd., 192 Va. 329, 333, 64 S.E.2d 767, 770 (1951).
90. See Adams, supra note 6, at 18.
91. But see Reeves v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 10 Va. Cir. 466 (City of Roanoke
1988) (An appeal under the Unemployment Compensation Act filed one day after the
mandatory twenty-day filing period expired was allowed to proceed. The court reasoned
that mail notification of an agency decision entitled petitioner to at least one more day).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
93. 233 Va. 17, 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987); See Jones, supra note 23, at 635-37.
94. Act of April 9, 1988, ch. 608, 1988 Va. Acts 792 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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A. Housekeeping and Clarifying Amendments Enacted
The General Assembly became concerned with the problem
caused when agency regulations inaccurately cite statutory refer-
ences. Certain types of agency regulations are exempted from the
usual public notice and comment requirements of VAPA for their
promulgation. 5 These exemptions apply to certain non-controver-
sial matters such as regulations pertaining to agency organization,
technical corrections to existing regulations, or emergency regula-
tions of limited duration."' The General Assembly responded to
concerns that certain agency regulations inaccurately cite statutory
references, thereby creating confusion. Consequently, VAPA now
requires every agency governed by VAPA to review all Virginia
Code references cited within their regulations to insure the accu-
racy of each section or subsection. The agency must conduct this
review annually, or each time a new Virginia Code supplement or
replacement volume is issued. Any changes resulting from this re-
view need not comply with the VAPA public notice and comment
procedures. 7
The second amendment placed a maximum twelve-month limi-
tation on emergency regulations adopted without public notice and
comment.98 Before the change, VAPA merely stated that such
emergency regulations would be "limited in duration."99 Also, the
bill clarified that adopted regulations which are exempt from the
public notice and comment provisions of VAPA become effective
thirty days after publication of the final regulation in the Virginia
Register, or at such later time specified in the final regulation.100
Thus, such regulations will become effective during the same time-
frame governing regulations promulgated pursuant to VAPA. Final
emergency regulations are effective upon their filing with the Reg-
istrar of Regulations.0 1
Another housekeeping provision in this bill empowers the Regis-
95. See Va. Code Ann. § 9-6.14:4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
96. Id.
97. Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 820, 1988 Va. Acts 1638 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
98. Act of March 29, 1988, ch. 364, 1988 Va. Acts 440 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1985).
100. Act of March 29, 1988, ch. 364, 1988 Va. Acts 440 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
101. Id.
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trar to avoid publishing the complete text of the final regulation in
the Virginia Register of Regulations if there is no change from the
previously published proposed regulation. Also, if the changes can
be clearly and concisely explained and reference is made to the
issue and page numbers of the Virginia Register where the pro-
posed regulation was previously published, 102 the Registrar need
not publish the complete text.
B. Standards for Inspection of Buildings for Asbestos Exempt
from VAPA
The Director of the Department of General Services is required
to promulgate standards for the inspection of buildings of all
types, including public school buildings, for the purpose of identi-
fying the presence of asbestos and the relative health or safety haz-
ard posed by any asbestos found. 0 3 Until the 1988 session of the
General Assembly took action, it was assumed that such standards
came within the VAPA definition of a regulation requiring adher-
ence to VAPA procedures for their promulgation.104 The General
Assembly, however, has specifically exempted the promulgation of
such standards from VAPA.10 5 The Director is required, however,
to adopt procedures providing for written public comment and the
consideration of such written comment prior to the adoption of the
asbestos inspection standards.0 "
These asbestos inspection standards will be applicable to inspec-
tions in public schools, hospitals, 0 7 buildings to be renovated or
demolished, 108 condominium conversions,109 and child-care cen-
ters. 10 The reason for this VAPA exemption is not clear. It should
be noted, however, that recently promulgated asbestos licensing
regulations have also been excluded from the public notice and
comment requirements of VAPA."'
102. Act of March 29, 1988, ch. 364, 1988 Va. Acts 440 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.14:22 (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-526.14 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1988); see also Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-54 (Supp. IV 1986).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4(F) (Rep. Vol. 1985).
105. Id. § 2.1-526.14 (Cum. Supp. 1988); Id. § 9-6.14:4.1(A)(12).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-526.14 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
107. Id. § 32.1-126.1.
108. Id. § 36-99.7.
109. Id. § 55-79.94(A)(5).
110. Id. § 63.1-198.01 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
111. 4 Va. Regs. Reg. 1768-91 (1988).
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C. Appellate Courts Empowered to Transfer Appeal
In Commonwealth v. Yeatts," 2 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the proper appellate forum for an appeal from a state agency
decision was the court of appeals, not the supreme court.113 The
supreme court found itself without jurisdiction to entertain the
Virginia Department of Highways and Transportation's (VDHT)
appeal from an adverse trial court decision reversing the state
agency's final decision. On oral argument, VDHT asked the court
to remand the case to the court of appeals. The supreme court de-
clared itself without sufficient authority to grant the request and
dismissed VDHT's appeal. 4
The General Assembly supplied the gap in authority by enacting
a new statute.1 5 The statute directs that no appeal, otherwise
properly and timely filed, shall be dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion solely due to filing in the wrong appellate court. According to
the statute, the appeal shall be transferred to the appellate court
having appropriate jurisdiction, and the transferor court shall al-
low a reasonable time for the parties to file such amended plead-
ings as may be necessary for the transferee appellate court to con-
sider the appeal.116 This common sense statute should avoid the
harsh result of Yeatts and ensure that otherwise meritorious ap-
peals are not dismissed due to confusion as to the jurisdiction of
the Commonwealth's appellate courts.
D. VAPA Applies to Chesapeake Bay Criteria
The General Assembly attracted considerable attention when it
enacted the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act during the 1988 ses-
sion.117 The Act established a new agency, the Chesapeake Bay Lo-
cal Assistance Department, with broad powers to require local gov-
ernments in "Tidewater Virginia" 1 8 to incorporate general water
112. 233 Va. 17, 353 S.E.2d 717 (1987).
113. Id. at 24, 353 S.E.2d at 721.
114. Id.
115. Act of March 30, 1988, ch. 382, 1988 Va. Acts 462 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-677.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
116. Id.
117. Act of April 9, 1988, ch. 608, 1988 Va. Acts 738, (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
118. "Tidewater Virginia" includes the "Counties of Accomack, Arlington, Caroline,
Charles City, Chesterfield, Essex, Fairfax, Gloucester, Hanover, Henrico, Isle of Wight,
James City, King George, King and Queen, King William, Lancaster, Mathews, Middlesex,
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quality protection measures into their comprehensive plans, zoning
ordinances, and subdivision ordinances so as to define and protect
areas within Tidewater Virginia designated as "Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Areas.""' 9
Of particular interest to administrative lawyers is the fact that
the new Department must promulgate all of its regulations, includ-
ing the criteria to establish the Preservation Areas, in accordance
with VAPA.12 0 All enforcement actions taken by the new Depart-
ment against the affected localities to ensure compliance with the
Act must be in accordance with VAPA.12' The Act requires the De-
partment to develop the criteria and regulations by July 1, 1989,
an extraordinary task for a brand new agency. 2 2 In order to meet
this statutory deadline, the new Department will not have extra
time to develop what are certain to be controversial regulations
and still be able to navigate the procedural shoals of VAPA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past year, Virginia's appellate courts have added greater
certainty to the law of judicial review of agency action. The identi-
fication of factual versus legal issues and the degree of deference to
be accorded agency decisions regarding those issues provides a
light to illuminate the dark path lawyers travel when seeking to set
aside agency action. In addition, it is reasonably clear that per se
constitutional due process challenges to decision making will be
unsuccessful. It appears that a challenge to the impartiality of the
tribunal will fail in the absence of evidence of actual bias or
prejudice. This ruling in particular, may result in attorneys seeking
collateral hearings to prove the impartiality of agency-employed
hearing officers.
By comparison, the legislative arena was relatively quiet. The
General Assembly should be commended for allowing appellate
courts to transfer improperly filed appeals. The list of agency and/
New Kent, Northampton, Northumberland, Prince George, Prince William, Richmond,
Spotsylvania, Stafford, Surry, Westmoreland, and York, and the Cities of Alexandria, Ches-
apeake, Colonial Heights, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg, Hampton, Hopewell, New-
port News, Norfolk, Petersburg, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Richmond, Suffolk, Virginia Beach,
and Williamsburg." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2101 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
119. Id. §§ 10.1-2103(7)-(8), -2107(A), -2109.
120. Id. § 10.1-2103(4).
121. Id. § 10.1-2103(10).
122. Id. § 10.1-2107(E).
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or subject matter exclusions from VAPA for the adoption of regu-
lations has expanded. Surprisingly, asbestos inspection stan-
dards-a matter with the potential to arouse public contro-
versy-have been removed from the public notice and comment
procedures guaranteed by VAPA. Reconsideration should be given
to the criteria employed by the General Assembly when authoriz-
ing agencies to foreclose the public from participating fully in the
adoption of regulations which will govern them.
In the next several years, attention will remain focused on the
clean up of the Chesapeake Bay. The establishment of the Chesa-
peake Bay Local Assistance Department is a cooperative effort by
the State and political subdivisions to protect and reclaim an im-
portant national resource. By application of VAPA the State will
regulate land use matters that have traditionally been left to local
government. This is an experiment that bears watching.

